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RELIGIOUS RITUAL EXEMPTIONS: SACRIFICING
ANIMAL RIGHTS FOR IDEOLOGY
Time and time again people cry "sentimentality, " and say in the
time of world upheaval there are more important things to think
about. But what kind of a civilization is it which does not recog-
nize any values besides the materialistic ones? I think the quali-
ties of a civilization are evident in the treatment of the weak and
powerless.
I. INTRODUCTION
In 1958, Congress passed the Humane Slaughter Act,2 (the Humane
Slaughter Act or the Act), thereby implementing a public policy that the
slaughtering of livestock be carried out by humane methods only.3 Spe-
cifically, the Act required that animals be made unconscious prior to
slaughter.4 The new rule conflicted with the requirements of Jewish diet-
ary law that the animal be conscious when slaughtered.' Thus, the Act
accommodated this requirement by, on the one hand, listing the Jewish
method of slaughter as humane, and on the other, by exempting ritual
slaughter from the specifications of the Act.6 The inconsistency resulted
from the fact that while the ritual method of slaughter was humane, it
necessarily required a method of restraint by which fully conscious ani-
mals are shackled by a rear leg and hoisted off the floor to await
slaughter.
1. Humane Slaughtering of Livestock and Poultry: Hearings on . 1636 Before a Sub-
comm. of the Comm. on Agriculture and Forestry, 84th Cong., 2d Sess. 138 (1956) [hereinafter
Hearings] (statement of R. Harvey Dastrup, legislative assistant) (emphasis added). Senate bill
1636 was the precursor to Senate bills 1213 and 1497 and House bill 8308, all of which had the
similar purpose of enacting humane slaughter legislation. See H.R. 8308, 85th Cong., 2d Sess.
(1958); S. 1497, 85th Cong., 2d Sess. (1958); S. 1213, 85th Cong., 1st Sess. (1957). While
Senate bill 1636 was passed in the Senate, no action was taken on it in the House before the
end of the session. Thus, similar legislation was reintroduced during the first session of the
eighty-fifth Congress. The hearings on the later proposed bills are similar to those on Senate
bill 1636. See Humane Slaughtering of Livestock: Hearings on S. 1213, S. 1497 and H.R. 8308
Before the Senate Comm. on Agriculture and Forestry, 85th Cong., 2d Sess. (1958).
2. Act of Aug. 27, 1958, Pub. L. No. 85-765, 72 Stat. 862, amended by Humane Methods
of Slaughter Act of 1978, Pub. L. No. 95-445, § 5, 92 Stat. 1069, 1069 (codified as amended at
7 U.S.C. §§ 1901-1906 (1988)).
3. 7 U.S.C. § 1901.
4. Id.
5. P. SINGER, ANIMAL LIBERATION 153 (2d ed. 1990).
6. See 7 U.S.C. §§ 1901(b), 1906.
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In the city of Hialeah, Florida, city ordinances prohibit cruelty to
animals.7 No exemption accommodates the Santeria religion whose reli-
gious ceremonies involve animal sacrifice. Members of the Santeria
Church of Lukumi Babalu Aye are challenging the ordinance on the
grounds that it infringes on their free exercise rights under the first
amendment of the United States Constitution."
This Comment analyzes the conflict between animal rights and the
first amendment right to free exercise of religion by examining two re-
lated issues. First, it discusses both the purpose of the Humane Slaugh-
ter Act and the inconsistency which the ritual slaughter exemption poses
for this purpose. It suggests that contrary to statements in the Act, ritual
slaughter is not conducted humanely. The Comment proposes a statute
to require ritual slaughterers to implement alternative methods of slaugh-
ter which permit compliance with the humane purposes of the Act as
well as with the ritual requirements. This section of the Comment is
concerned primarily with demonstrating that there is a practical solution
to this particular problem and that Congress should amend the Humane
Slaughter Act to effect it.
The Comment then recognizes the broader issue in animal rights/
free exercise controversies-whether animal rights might be permitted
generally to surpass free exercise rights. It discusses the historical pro-
gression of the Supreme Court's interpretation of the free exercise right.
It then analyzes the Santeria animal sacrifice/free exercise controversy as
illustrative of the broader issue and suggests that, in fact, there may be no
basis for constitutionally required exemptions from laws intended to pro-
tect animals. Finally, the Comment concludes that, in light of the grow-
ing recognition of animal rights and our moral inclination that sentient
beings have a right to live free from abuse, such exemptions should not
be permitted.
II. BACKGROUND
In 1958, Congress enacted the Humane Slaughter Act,9 setting forth
as a "policy of the United States that the slaughtering of livestock and
the handling of livestock in connection with slaughter shall be carried
7. Hialeah, Fla., Ordinances 87-40 (June 9, 1987); id. 87-52 (Sept. 8, 1987); id. 87-71
(Sept. 22, 1987); id. 87-72 (Sept. 22, 1987).
8. Church of the Lukumi Babalu Aye v. City of Hialeah, 723 F. Supp. 1467 (S.D. Fla.
1989), appealfiled, No. 90-5176 (1lth Cir. Feb. 22, 1990); U.S. CONsT. amend I.
9. Act of Aug. 27, 1958, Pub. L. No. 85-765, 72 Stat. 862, amended by Humane Methods
of Slaughter Act of 1978, Pub. L. No. 95-445, § 5, 92 Stat. 1069, 1069 (codified as amended at
7 U.S.C. §§ 1901-1906 (1988)).
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out only by humane methods."1 The Humane Slaughter Act sets out
two different methods of slaughter which Congress determined were hu-
mane.11 Section 1902(a) provides that the animal must be rendered un-
conscious before being shackled, hoisted and bled.' 2 Section 1902(b)
provides, alternatively, that the animal may be slaughtered in accordance
with a religious ritual whereby the carotid arteries are simultaneously
and instantaneously severed with a sharp instrument.
13
The religious ritual provided for in section 1902(b), termed
shechitah in Hebrew, 4 involves killing the animal with a quick forward
and backward movement of a finely sharpened knife, i" severing the four
major blood vessels in the throat and cutting both the trachea and the
esophagus. 16 Many commentators have suggested that this method is a
humane way to slaughter livestock, 7 because the animal quickly be-
comes unconscious.' In fact, the Jewish religion has placed great value
10. 7 U.S.C. § 1901 (1988).
11. Id. § 1902. The section provides, in relevant part,
Either of the following two methods of slaughtering and handling are hereby found
to be humane:
(a) in the case of cattle, calves, horses, mules, sheep, swine, and other live-
stock, all animals are rendered insensible to pain by a single blow or gunshot or
an electrical, chemical or other means that is rapid and effective, before being
shackled, hoisted, thrown, cast, or cut; or
(b) by slaughtering in accordance with the ritual requirements of the Jew-
ish faith or any other religious faith that prescribes a method of slaughter
whereby the animal suffers loss of consciousness by anemia of the brain caused
by the simultaneous and instantaneous severance of the carotid arteries with a
sharp instrument and handling in connection with such slaughter.
Id.
12. Id. § 1902(a).
13. Id. § 1902(b).
14. Lovenheim, Using Restraint, MOMENT, Jan.-Feb. 1983, at 62, 62.
15. Nicks in the blade are likely to cause the animal pain which is inconsistent with the
Jewish tradition concerning humane treatment of animals. Grandin, Humanitarian Aspects of
Shehitah in the United States, 39 JUDAISM: Q.J. JEWISH LIFE & THOUGHT 436, 436 (1990).
16. Id.
17. See, e.g., Hearings, supra note 1, at 139, 144-46, 164-65; H.H. DONIN, To BE A JEW
107 (1972); J. NEUSNER, THE LIFE OF TORAH 97-98 (1974).
18. Grandin, supra note 15, at 443. There is a consensus in the scientific community, for
example, that sheep and goats lose consciousness within two to fifteen seconds after the cut.
Id. For calves and cattle, however, the figures range from four to as long as sixty seconds. Id.
The variation may be due to the skill of the shochet (ritual slaughterer). Id. at 444. Grandin
made the following observation during one ritual slaughter:
At [one plant] it was possible to observe accurately the reactions of hundreds of 375
lb. veal calves to shehitah. The most skillful shohet was able to cause over 95 percent
of the calves to collapse immediately. When a less skilled shohet performed shehitah,
up to 30 percent of the calves righted themselves on the table and some animals even
walked on the moving table like on a treadmill.
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on the humane treatment of animals, 9 and the original intentions behind
the ritual slaughter requirements may have been humanitarian.20 Never-
theless, hygiene requirements under United States federal law have pro-
duced a dichotomy between the original motives of Jewish law and the
current ritual slaughter methods which have turned ritual slaughter
"into a grotesque travesty of any humane intentions that may once have
lain behind it."
'21
In Florida, the Santeria22 practice of animal sacrifice presents a sim-
ilar controversy involving humane laws and religious practices. The di-
lemma with the Santeria practice, however, is even more compelling
because there is no humane alternative. There is scientific evidence that
the manner of killing during the sacrifices is inhumane.23 In 1987, the
City of Hialeah, Florida passed several animal anti-cruelty statutes in
19. See, eg., Lovenheim, supra note 14, at 62. Lovenheim noted:
The concept of tsa'ar ba'alei chaim, prevention of cruelty to animals, is an important
doctrine of Jewish law. It is forbidden, for example, to harness to a plough two
animals of different species. One should not muzzle an ox during threshing. Ani-
mals should be allowed to rest on the Sabbath and on holy days.
Id. (citations omitted); see also Jones v. Butz, 374 F. Supp. 1284, 1288 (S.D.N.Y.) (Jewish
"religious beliefs have a long historical association with the humane treatment of animals."),
aff'd merm., 419 U.S. 806 (1974); Hearings, supra note 1, at 139 (statement of Rabbi Isaac
Lewin, Executive Committee, Union of Orthodox Rabbis of the United States and Canada,
New York, N.Y.) ("Humane treatment of animals is an ideal which appeals to all decent men
and women. In Judaism this is much more than an ideal as yet to be achieved in the future.").
20. See Hearings, supra note 1, at 141 (statement of Leo Pfeffer, Counsel, American Jew-
ish Congress) ("[Tihe causing of pain to any living thing... is a violation of religious law, and
that is why the Jewish religion for thousands of years had engaged in this expensive, difficult
method of slaughtering in order to avoid unnecessary pain to a live being."); J. NEUSNER,
supra note 17, at 98.
21. P. SINGER, supra note 5, at 154.
22. The Santeria, generically referred to as "Yoruba" or "Yoba," is a religion represented
by the Church of the Lukui Babalu Aye. Church of the Lukumi Babalu Aye v. City of
Hialeah, 723 F. Supp. 1467, 1469 (S.D. Fla. 1989), appealfiled, No. 90-5176 (11th Cir. Feb.
22, 1990). The religion originated almost 4,000 years ago in West Africa. Id. It is one of the
three indigenous religions of the Yoruba people and is practiced openly in Nigeria today. Id.
In the sixteenth, seventeenth and eighteenth centuries, many Yoruba practitioners were en-
slaved and taken to Cuba where their religion was forbidden. Id. For 400 years thereafter, the
religion was practiced underground mostly by slaves and their descendants. Id. at 1470.
Santeria first came to the United States with the Cuban exiles who fled Fidel Castro's
regime between 1950 and 1960. Id. There are approximately 50,000 to 60,000 Santeria practi-
tioners in South Florida today. Id. The number who practice animal sacrifice is unknown.
Id.
The Santeria religion is not socially accepted in the Cuban population and, consequently,
has been practiced privately in individual homes. Id. Santeria has an interrelationship with
the conduct of life such as holidays, Sabbath, and days of worship. Id. There are ceremonies
for life cycle events like child birth, marriage and death. Id. The ceremonies which involve
animal sacrifice include the initiation rite and the faith healing rite. Id. at 1473-74.
23. Id. at 1472.
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response to an epidemic of ritual killing of animals in the city.24 The
ordinances were intended to prohibit all ritual killings and were not
targeted specifically at the Santeria religion.25 In fact, the ordinances did
not mention religion at all and applied equally to cults, fraternities, or
any individual or organization practicing animal sacrifice.26 The
Santeria Church of Lukumi Babalu Aye has challenged the ordinance,
claiming that it violates its rights to free exercise of religion.27
III. ANALYSIS
A. The Problem with Ritual Slaughter
1. The shackle-hoist method of restraint
The problem with ritual slaughter stems from a dichotomy between
United States hygiene law and requirements of Jewish dietary law.28
United States Department of Agriculture regulations29 provide that an
animal becomes "adulterated" if "[i]t has been prepared... under un-
sanitary conditions whereby it may have become contaminated with
filth."30 Thus, "casting," or laying an animal on the floor to restrain it
for slaughter, is prohibited due to sanitary concerns that it will become
contaminated with dirt or manure.31 This means that the animal must be
24. Hialeah, Fla., Ordinance 87-40 (June 9, 1987); id. 87-52 (Sept. 8, 1987); id. 87-71
(Sept. 22, 1987); id. 87-72 (Sept. 22, 1987).
25. Brief of the Humane Society of the United States, as Amicus Curiae in Support of
Appellee, City of Hialeah at 1, Church of the Lukumi Babalu Aye v. City of Hialeah, No. 90-
5176 (11th Cir. filed Feb. 22, 1990).
26. Id. at 6; see Hialeah, Fla., Ordinance 87-52 (Sept. 8, 1987) ("This section is applicable
to any group or individual that kills, slaughters or sacrifices animals for any type of ritual,
regardless of whether or not the flesh or blood of the animal is to be consumed."); id. 87-71
(Sept. 22, 1987) ("It shall be unlawful for any person, persons, corporations or associations to
sacrifice any animal within the corporate limits of the City of Hialeah, Florida.").
27. Church of Lukumi Babalu Aye, 723 F. Supp. at 1469.
28. P. SINGER, supra note 5, at 154. It should be emphasized at the outset that hoisting
and shackling is not part of the religious ritual, but a method of animal restraint which, when
used with the ritual, becomes objectionable. Much scientific evidence exists for the proposition
that the ritual method of slaughter is humane. See supra notes 17-18 and accompanying text.
There is an argument, however, that even if more humane restraint alternatives were imple-
mented for kosher slaughter, an animal that is conscious prior to having its throat cut (kosher),
would arguably experience more fear and stress than an animal rendered unconscious prior to
this procedure (non-kosher). To the extent that this is true, the discussion at infra notes 119-
229 and accompanying text, concerning whether there is ever a need to sacrifice animal rights
to accommodate religious practice, would apply.
29. The regulations were enacted pursuant to the authority vested in the Department of
Agriculture by the Meat Inspection Act, 21 U.S.C. §§ 601-695 (1988).
30. 9 C.F.R. § 301.2(c)(4) (1990).
31. Grandin, supra note 15, at 437; see Jones v. Butz, 374 F. Supp. 1284, 1290 n.8
(S.D.N.Y.), aff'd mem., 419 U.S. 806 (1974); Lovenheim, supra note 14, at 63.
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suspended from a conveyor belt or held up off the floor by some other
means before it is killed.a2 This hygiene requirement poses no difficulty
in the slaughter of animals for non-kosher use because these animals are
rendered unconscious with the use of a stunning device prior to being
shackled, hoisted and bled.33 Jewish law, on the other hand, requires
that the animal be "healthy and moving" when slaughtered.34 Thus,
when the requirements of ritual slaughter act in conjunction with those
of the hygiene laws, the result is that animals are shackled and hoisted
while still fully conscious.3a
Temple Grandin, an assistant professor of animal science at Colo-
rado State University, has stated,
Shackling and hoisting of conscious animals for ritual slaughter
is an area of our profession in need of major housecleaning.
I have been in hundreds of slaughter plants, but I had
nightmares after visiting one plant in which five big steers were
hung up in a row to await slaughter. They were hitting the
walls, and their bellowing could be heard out in the parking lot.
To get the shackles on the live cattle, the operation was
equipped with a pen with a false bottom that tripped the animal
to make it fall down.36
Today, the percentage of steers which are kosher-slaughtered in the
United States by being shackled and hoisted while conscious has been
reduced due to advances in alternative technologies. 37 As of 1989, ap-
proximately ten to twenty percent of kosher cattle are slaughtered using
the shackle and hoist method.a This still means a gruesome atrocity
committed against a significant number of animals.39  Furthermore, the
development of similar technologies for smaller animals has become
32. P. SINGER, supra note 5, at 154.
33. Lovenheim, supra note 14, at 62.
34. P. SINGER, supra note 5, at 153. The purpose of this requirement may have been to
prohibit consumption of an animal which had been found sick or dead. Id.
35. Id. at 154.
36. Grandin, Shackling, Hoisting Live Animals ls Cruel, MEAT & PouLTY, Sept. 1987, at
142, 142-43. Temple Grandin, Ph.D. (American Registry of Professional Animal Scientists),
is also a livestock handling consultant. Grandin, Where Reform Is Needed: Bob Calf Han-
dling and Veal Calf Slaughter, LARGE ANIMAL VETERINARIAN, Jan.-Feb. 1989, at 39, 39.
Her company, Grandin Livestock Handling Systems, Inc., specializes in design of livestock
handling facilities for feed lots, ranches, auctions, and packing plants. Id.
37. See infra notes 79-103 and accompanying text for a discussion of the American Society
for the Prevention of Cruelty to Animals (ASPCA) pen, the V conveyor restrainer, and the
double rail restrainer as new alternatives for humane ritual slaughter.
38. Grandin, supra note 15, at 438.
39. See infra notes 91-94 and accompanying text.
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fruitful only recently." Consequently, over ninety percent of kosher veal
and almost one hundred percent of kosher lambs and sheep are still
slaughtered using shackling and hoisting.
41
Once the animals are shackled and hoisted, the length of time they
spend on the conveyor belt before they are killed varies.42 One witness
noted that the animal hung for thirty-five seconds before its throat was
cut.43 Singer, an animial rights advocate, has suggested that animals rit-
ually slaughtered in the United States may be shackled and hoisted, and
"then [hung], fully conscious, upside down on the conveyor belt for be-
tween two and five minutes-and occasionally much longer if something
goes wrong on the 'killing line'-before the slaughterer makes his cut." 44
This may be due to the fact that in some plants, five or six animals at a
time may be hanging conscious on the chains awaiting slaughter.45 Ad-
ditionally, the ritual slaughterers are sometimes not well trained in mak-
ing the cut correctly, causing the animal to suffer a prolonged death.'
The practice of shackling and hoisting conscious animals continues
because ritual slaughter is exempt from the requirements of the Humane
Slaughter Act.47 Additionally, meat packing and slaughtering compa-
nies are reluctant to voluntarily incur the expense of acquiring handling
equipment which is more humane.48
2. The inconsistency in the Humane Slaughter Act
During the senate hearings on the Humane Slaughter Act,49 the
Union of Orthodox Rabbis of the United States and Canada and the
American Jewish Congress expressed alarm at the Act as originally
drafted."0 As originally drafted, the Act listed kosher slaughter as an
40. See infra notes 95-99 and accompanying text.
41. Grandin, supra note 15, at 438.
42. The conveyor belt is the device that transports the animal to the slaughterer.
43. Lovenheim, supra note 14, at 62.
44. P. SINGER, supra note 5, at 154.
45. Grandin, supra note 15, at 438.
46. See Grandin, State of the Art, Humane Slaughter System Installed at Utica Veal,
VEALER MAG., May 1987, at 6, 9. See supra note 18 for a discussion of the effect of variation
in skill of the shochet.
47. See 7 U.S.C. § 1906 (1988).
48. P. SINGER, supra note 5, at 152-56.
49. Act of Aug. 27, 1958, Pub. L. No. 85-765, 72 Stat. 862, amended by Humane Methods
of Slaughter Act of 1978, Pub. L. No. 95-445, § 5, 92 Stat. 1069, 1069 (codified as amended at
7 U.S.C. §§ 1901-1906 (1988)).
50. Hearings, supra note 1, at 139 (statement of Rabbi Isaac Lewin, Executive Committee,
Union of Orthodox Rabbis of the United States and Canada, New York, N.Y.) ("We are...
firmly opposed to the present measure because by implication it brands the Jewish ritualistic
method of slaughter ... as not humane. Such implication is indeed offensive, and has no basis
1373
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exception to humane slaughter, and not, as it currently provides in sec-
tion 2(b), as a humane alternative. 1 The change in form may have been
due to the concern with anti-Semitic propaganda which accompanied
similar exemptions in other countries. 52
While the actual throat cut prescribed by the ritual method may be
humane,53 the pre-slaughter handling of the animal clearly is not. Con-
sequently, section 2(b) is inconsistent with the purpose underlying the
Act which advocates the humane slaughter of animals. The effect of sec-
tion 2(b) is that of an exemption and section 6, the catch-all provision,
although deceptively severed from it, attests to that.54 Section 6 indicates
that ritual slaughter and the handling of animals in connection with rit-
ual slaughter are "exempt" in order to protect freedom of religion.55
This section also provides, "[flor the purposes of this section the term
'ritual slaughter' means slaughter in accordance with section 2(b)."56
Why did Congress exempt a method of slaughter which it had deter-
mined was humane? Clearly, there is an inconsistency. This is because
in fact."); id. at 141 (statement of Leo Pfeffer, Counsel, American Jewish Congress) ("We are
concerned that you have put into your bill an exemption for kosher slaughter. Our objection
to your bill as it was originally drafted was that it gives a completely false impression of the
Jewish method of slaughtering.").
51. The relevant portions of the Act as originally drafted provided:
Sec. 2 (a) No slaughterer shall bleed or slaughter any livestock unless such livestock
has first been rendered insensible by mechanical, electrical, chemical, or other means
determined by the Secretary to be rapid, effective, and humane.
(c) The requirements of this section shall not apply to any individual who is
duly authorized by an ordained rabbi of the Jewish religious faith to serve as a
schector, while such individual is engaged in the slaughtering of livestock.., in
accordance with the practice of such religious faith.
Hearings, supra note 1, at 3-4.
The Act as passed, on the other hand, provides in relevant part:
See. 2. ... Either of the following two methods of slaughtering and handling are
hereby found to be humane:
(a) ... all animals are rendered insensible to pain by a single blow or gunshot
or an electrical, chemical or other means that is rapid and effective, before being
shackled, hoisted, thrown, cast, or cut; or
(b) by slaughtering in accordance with the ritual requirements of the Jewish
faith or any other religious faith that prescribes a method of slaughter whereby the
animal suffers loss of consciousness by anemia of the brain caused by the simultane-
ous and instantaneous severance of the carotid arteries with a sharp instrument.
Act of Aug. 27, 1958, Pub. L. No. 85-765, § 2, 72 Stat. 862, 862 (current version at 7 U.S.C.
§ 1902 (1988)).
52. Jones, 374 F. Supp. at 1289 n.7.
53. See supra notes 17-18 and accompanying text.
54. See 7 U.S.C. § 1906 (1988).
55. Id.
56. Id.
57. The legislative history of the humane slaughter bill indicates that the inconsistency was
apparent in 1958.
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while circumstances exist under which kosher slaughter can be con-
ducted in a humane manner,58 at the time the Act was passed, restraint
for kosher slaughter in the United States was generally not humane.5 9
The restraint method of shackling and hoisting conscious animals cannot
be humane, regardless of how humane the killing might be.6
Under paragraph (b) of section 2 of the bill, slaughtering in conformity with the
ritual requirements of the Jewish faith is found to be humane. It appears from the
language of this paragraph that the description of this method applies to slaughtering
only and not to handling animals in connection with slaughter, in which case the
handling of the animals would have to be in compliance with a method designated
and approved by the Secretary .... During the discussion in the House, it was stated
that the provisions of paragraph (b) of section 2 "are not intended to deny the De-
partment of Agriculture the right and power to prohibit any form of shackling and
hoisting of conscious animals" .....
It is not clear what effect, if any, section 6 of the bill would have upon this
situation .... In view of the language of sections 2 and 6 of the bill, the remarks
made during the discussion of the bill in the House, and the lack of knowledge with
respect to the Weinberg pen, it is difficult for this Department to determine what
administrative action would be appropriate if this bill becomes law.
S. REP. No. 1724, 85th Cong., 2d Sess. 8, reprinted in 1958 U.S. CODE CONG. & ADMIN.
NEws 3932, 3938 (quoting 104 CONG. REc. 1430 (daily ed. Feb. 4, 1958)). See infra note 59
for a discussion of the Weinberg pen.
The language of section 2(b) indicates that the religious method described
therein as being humane applies to slaughter only and does not encompass the han-
dling in connection with slaughter. The discussion on the floor of the House of Rep-
resentatives concerning the provisions of this section also indicated that the described
method is not intended to apply to such handling.
Id. at 12, reprinted in 1958 U.S. CODE CONG. & ADMIN. NEws at 3942.
Apparently, however, the House attempt to prohibit shackling and hoisting was defeated
in the Senate. See Humane Methods of Slaughter Act of 1977 Hearing on H.R. 1464 Before
the Subcomm. on Livestock and Grains of the House Comm. on Agriculture, 95th Cong., 2d
Sess. 9 (1978) (statement of Christine Stevens, Secretary, Society for Animal Protective
Legislation).
58. For example, in Jones v. Butz, the intervenors for the defendants noted, "In Israel, and
indeed, in the old traditional Jewish method, the animal would be laying down on its side, and
the throat would be cut on the floor." 374 F. Supp. 1284, 1290 n.8 (S.D.N.Y.), aff'd mem.,
419 U.S. 806 (1974). Thus, the cruel restraining method of shackling and hoisting was not
necessary. "That is not permitted under Department of Agriculture regulations for sanitary
reasons. You can't put an animal down in a Department of Agriculture inspected plant on the
ground." Id.
59. The development of humane technologies that allow for kosher slaughter without
shackling and hoisting the animal occurred after the Act was passed. See infra notes 80-103
and accompanying text. Over forty years ago, the Weinberg cattle casting pen was developed
in Europe. Grandin, supra note 15, at 439. This, however, was also not an upright restraining
device. Id. The pen consists of a narrow stall which inverts the animal slowly until it is lying
on its side. Id. While this is less stressful than shackling and hoisting, research indicates that
the animals restrained in this manner had higher stress hormone levels and more vocalizations
than animals restrained upright. Id. The Weinberg device, however, was not used commer-
cially in the United States at the time the Act was passed-probably because there was little
knowledge of its practicability for high-speed commercial plants. S. REP. No. 1724, supra
note 57, at 8, reprinted in 1958 U.S. CODE CONG. & ADMIN. NEws at 3938.
60. See supra notes 28-48 and accompanying text.
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The apparent inconsistency is supported as well by section 4(c) of
the original Act. This section provided: "Handling in connection with
such slaughter which necessarily accompanies the method of slaughter
described in subsection (b)... shall be deemed to comply with the public
policy specified by this section. ' 61 Congress's choice of words may indi-
cate that by "deeming" the handling humane, the drafters avoided the
practical inconsistency which the ritual slaughter provision posed for the
statute's purpose. Furthermore, because the provision applies to section
2(b), it appears to be "misplaced," an apparent attempt by the draftsmen
"to avoid the appearance of inconsistency. ' 62 It might also be noted that
the 1978 revised version of the Act struck out section 4(c) and added to
section 2(b) the words "and handling in connection with such slaughter-
ing.",63 Thus, the revised Act, with the stroke of a pen, resolved the lit-
eral "misplacement" of the provision, completely ignoring that there is a
clear tension in finding "humane" a method of slaughter which required
a grossly inhumane method of restraint.
3. Jones v. Butz
In accordance with Jewish law, for meat to be kosher, not only must
it be slaughtered by the throat cutting method described earlier,64 but the
sciatic nerve of the hindquarter must also be removed .6  This require-
ment stems from the tale in Genesis of Jacob wrestling with a mysterious
stranger during which he injured the nerve of his thigh.66 Thus, the To-
rah requires that Jewish people do not eat the sciatic nerve. 7
Complete removal of the sciatic nerve involves much labor.6 8
Therefore, it is more economical to sell the hindquarter of an animal
slaughtered by the ritual method to the general market than it is to re-
61. Act of Aug. 27, 1958, § 4(c), 7 U.S.C. 1904(c) (1958), repealed by Humane Methods of
Slaughter Act of 1978, Pub. L. No. 95-445, § 5(b), 92 Stat. 1069, 1069 (emphasis added).
62. Jones, 374 F. Supp. at 1291. The court noted,
[S]ection 4(c), the misplaced provision of the statute, expressly refer[s] to section
2(b), setting forth the ritual method of slaughter, and state[s] that handling necessar-
ily connected with such method "shall be deemed to comply with the public policy
specified" by the statute. The draftsmen apparently attempted, perhaps inartistically,
to avoid the appearance of inconsistency.
Id.
63. See Humane Methods of Slaughter Act of 1978, Pub. L. No. 95-445, § 5(a), 92 Stat.
1069, 1069 (codified as amended at 7 U.S.C. § 1902(b) (1988)); supra note 61.
64. See supra notes 14-16 and accompanying text.
65. Hearings, supra note 1, at 147 (statement of David H. Greenwald, Counsel, American
Federation of Retail Kosher Butchers, New York, N.Y.); J. NEUSNER, supra note 17, at 97.
66. J. NEUSNER, supra note 17, at 97; see Genesis 32:25-26.
67. J. NEUSNER, supra note 17, at 97.
68. Id.
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move the sciatic nerve and sell the meat to the kosher market. 69 Conse-
quently, the meat of animals slaughtered by the shackle and hoist
method still employed by the religious ritual may unwittingly be
purchased by unknowing, non-Jewish consumers who would be unwill-
ing to purchase such meat were they informed about the method of
handling.70
In 1974, for the first time, a federal court was confronted with a
challenge to the religious ritual exemption of the Humane Slaughter Act
based on this deception. In Jones v. Butz, 7 1 the plaintiffs challenged the
ritual slaughter exemption from the Act on constitutional grounds.7 2
The plaintiffs claimed that the practice of selling the hindquarter of a
kosher-slaughtered animal to the general market made it impossible to
know with certainty whether the meat they were buying was slaughtered
by humane methods,73 and that this caused injury to their "moral princi-
ples" and "aesthetic sensibilities."'74 The plaintiffs requested that the
trial court declare the ritual slaughter provisions unconstitutional under
the establishment and the free exercise clauses of the first amendment to
the United States Constitution.75 The court, however, rejected the
69. Hearings, supra note 1, at 147 (statement of David H. Greenwald, Counsel, American
Federation of Retail Kosher Butchers, New York, N.Y.); J. NEUSNER, supra note 17, at 97.
70. P. SINGER, supra note 5, at 155. In Britain, the Farm Animal Welfare Council has
estimated that a large proportion of kosher slaughtered meat is sold to the general market. Id.
In the United States, fifty percent of kosher slaughtered animals, that is, the hindquarter, is
sold to the general market. Telephone interview with Temple Grandin (Mar. 24, 1991). Id.
Additionally, kosher slaughtered meat which is rejected by the shochet also ends up in the
general market. Id. Consequently, the majority of kosher slaughtered meat is purchased by
consumers in the general market.
71. 374 F. Supp. 1284 (S.D.N.Y.), aff'd memr., 419 U.S. 806 (1974).
72. Id. at 1286. The plaintiffs were six individuals and three organizations committed to
the humane treatment of animals. Id. at 1287.
73. Id.
74. Id. at 1289.
75. Id. at 1290-91; U.S. CONST. amend I. The plaintiffs claimed that the provision vio-
lated the establishment clause of the first amendment in that the exemption clearly had a
religious purpose. Jones, 374 F. Supp. at 1291. The court rejected this argument. It held that
the Act simply listed ritual slaughter as an alternative method of slaughter which was humane,
and that the establishment clause does not prohibit enactment of laws which happen to coin-
cide with the tenets of a religion. Id. at 1292. It seems, however, that the court avoided
resolution of the real issue. While it may be true that the ritual method of slaughter is a
humane method, it is not true that the method of restraint used with it is. Section 4(c) of the
Humane Slaughter Act unquestionably had the effect of exempting ritual slaughterers from
using a humane method of restraint. See siipra notes 61-63 and accompanying text. Thus, the
establishment clause argument is a plausible one which the court might have analyzed more
realistically. The establishment clause issue, however, is beyond the scope of this Comment.
The focus of the Comment's analysis of the kosher slaughter issue is that the availability of
alternatives to the present method of restraint makes the ritual slaughter exemption unneces-
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7 6
Nevertheless, Jones is important in that it was the first challenge to
the ritual slaughter provisions of the Humane Slaughter Act. While the
court held that the provisions of the Humane Slaughter Act do not vio-
late the first amendment, it apparently recognized that the plaintiffs were
airing a legitimate concern.77 Ultimately, however, the court noted that
"the proper forum for plaintiffs is the Congress and not the courts."1
78
4. Humane alternatives
The case for amending the Humane Slaughter Act to require that
ritual slaughter be conducted in a humane manner is strong. The availa-
bility of humane alternatives to the shackle and hoist method of restraint
has made it possible to satisfy the requirements of Jewish dietary law as
well as those of social decency.79 Thus, any balancing of religious inter-
ests and governmental interests must incorporate the fact that the former
can be accommodated without a burden on the latter.
At the time Congress passed the Humane Slaughter Act, most ko-
sher slaughter was conducted using the shackle and hoist method of re-
straint.8 0 Today technology is available to conduct ritual slaughter more
humanely and without the use of the shackle and hoist method.8" For
example, the American Association for the Prevention of Cruelty to Ani-
mals (ASPCA) pen has been an available alternative for restraining cattle
sary. See infra notes 79-103 and accompanying text. If such alternatives are implemented,
then the reasoning of the Jones court becomes more accurate.
The Jones court also rejected the plaintiffs' free exercise claim holding that the assertion
of ethical principles against eating ritually slaughtered meat was not sufficient to provide a free
exercise claim. Jones, 374 F. Supp. at 1294. It should be noted that the free exercise claim
asserted in Jones bears no relevance to the free exercise claims which this Comment analyzes.
Jones is cited simply because it is the only case challenging the ritual slaughter provision of the
Humane Slaughter Act.
76. Jones, 374 F. Supp. at 1293.
77. For example, in analyzing whether the plaintiffs had suffered an injury for the purpose
of standing, the court stated, "[W]e are willing to accept ... that governmental refusal to
purchase the meat of animals slaughtered by the ritual method would so influence production
in the great packing houses as to save plaintiffs from the uncertainty of which they complain."
Id. at 1289. At the time, the Humane Slaughter Act applied only to animals slaughtered for
the purpose of government procurement. 7 U.S.C. § 1903 (1970) (repealed 1978). The Act
was amended in 1978 to apply to the slaughter of animals in the United States meat industry in
general. See Humane Methods of Slaughter Act of 1978, Pub. L. No. 95-445, § 5(b), 92 Stat.
1069, 1069 (repealed at 7 U.S.C. § 1903 (1988)); see also H.R. REP. No. 1336, 95th Cong., 2d
Sess. 3-4, reprinted in 1978 U.S. CODE CONG. & ADMIN. NEWS 2650, 2651-52.
78. Jones, 374 F. Supp. at 1291.
79. See infra notes 80-103 and accompanying text.
80. See Grandin, supra note 15, at 437.
81. Id.
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since the 1960s.82 The pen is a narrow stall with an opening in front for
the animal's head.83 A lift supports the animal's belly and the animal's
head is raised by a chin lift.84 The chin lift holds the animal's head until
the throat is cut.85 Thus, the animal is shackled and hoisted only after
the slaughter.86
The V conveyor with a head holder is another alternative for re-
straining cattle.8 7 Under this method, the cattle ride between two con-
veyors which form a V.88 The animal remains in an upright position, its
body is supported by the angled conveyors along each side, and its feet
protrude through an opening between the bottom of the conveyors.89
The conveyor is stopped for the slaughterer, and a hydraulically operated
head holder lifts the animal's head for the cut.9'
Presently, about 2,000,000 heavy beef steers, 1,000,000 sheep, and
500,000 calves are slaughtered annually for kosher trade in the United
States.91 Yet in spite of the availability of alternatives, approximately ten
to twenty percent of kosher slaughtered steers are restrained using the
shackle and hoist method.92 Professor Grandin has indicated that for
one southern plant, approximately 1,200 large cattle are killed per day by
shackling and hoisting a conscious animal. 93 Thus, this still means an
intolerable amount of suffering for many farm animals. As one commen-
tator has noted, "When a heavy iron chain is clamped around the leg of a
heavy beef animal weighing between 1,000 and 2,000 pounds, and the
steer is jerked off its feet, the skin will open and slip away from the bone.
The canon bone will often be snapped or fractured." 94
The number of small animals which are slaughtered using the
shackle and hoist method of restraint is even more significant. Over
ninety percent of the calves and virtually one hundred percent of the
sheep and lamb slaughtered for sale as kosher meat are still being shack-
82. See id. at 439-40.
83. Id. at 440.
84. Id.
85. Id.
86. Id.
87. Id.
88. Id.
89. Id.
90. Id. at 440-41.
91. Karas, Ritual Slaughter Under Fire, J.N. Shore Jewish Community, Nov. 23, 1989, at
26, col. 3.
92. Grandin, supra note 15, at 438.
93. Karas, supra note 91, at 26, col. 3.
94. J. MACFARLANE, ANIMALS INTO MEAT: A REPORT ON THE PRE-SLAUGHTER HAN-
DLING OF LivEsToCK 16-17 (1971).
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led and hoisted while conscious.95 The availability of alternative technol-
ogies for small animals is only a recent development. 96  Grandin
Livestock Systems, Inc. has designed a new double rail restrainer system.
Under this system, the animal rides along a moving conveyor.97 It strad-
dles the double rail and is supported under its belly and brisket.98 The
conveyor is stopped for the slaughterer when the animal reaches the
end.
99
The availability of alternatives makes the religious ritual exemption
unnecessary and its purpose heavily outweighed by the governmental in-
terest in protecting animals from unnecessary abuse. The new humane
slaughter technology unfortunately has not been adopted widely because
ritual slaughter is exempt from the Humane Slaughter Act.100 Thus,
slaughterers who perform ritual slaughter have neither legal nor eco-
nomic incentive to implement these technologies.101 Only one kosher
veal plant has to date installed modern restraint equipment."0 2 While the
plant is to be commended for installing the new system, it must be noted
that the expense was shared by national humane organizations which
have only limited resources. 0 3
5. Proposed amendment to the Humane Slaughter Act
The current exemption for ritual slaughter under section 1902 is not
warranted in light of the availability of humane handling equipment
which satisfies the requirements of the religious ritual. No valid reason
exists for exempting ritual slaughterers from installing the new alterna-
tives. Although costs are a concern, such costs were also a concern for
the conventional slaughterer when the Act was passed."
95. Grandin, supra note 15, at 438.
96. The first upright restraining system for small animals was installed in a commercial
plant in 1986. Id. at 441. A wooden laboratory prototype had been developed by the Univer-
sity of Connecticut in the early 1970s, but was not a practical alternative for a commercial
plant. Id.
97. Id.
98. Id.
99. Id.
100. P. SINGER, supra note 5, at 155.
101. Id.
102. Grandin, supra note 15, at 438. The plant, Utica Veal in New Jersey, kosher slaught-
ers calves once a week at a rate of 120 to 150 per hour. Grandin, supra note 46, at 7.
103. Grandin, supra note 15, at 441.
104. See, eg., Hearings, supra note 1, at 72. Senator Humphrey, who originally proposed
the Act, stated:
[I]n anything where there is a change there is some cost involved....
This is true of a hundred and one different kinds of businesses. There isn't a
packinghouse in the country that hasn't had to revise its methods of moving the
carcasses at great cost. There have been tremendous costs. It expedites, it improves,
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Ritual slaughter should not be exempted from the ordinary costs of
doing business. "It is disturbing that two large shackle-hoist operators
spent large amounts of money and time fighting the government about
safety and animal rights groups. At one plant, the money already spent
on politics would have paid for a restraining pen."' 05 Additionally, while
modem restraint equipment can be costly, 06 so may the safety hazards
posed by heavy animals frantically struggling on a conveyor.' 0 7  Em-
ployees have been kicked in the head and have had their teeth knocked
out by the flailing front feet of the restrained animals. 10 8 At one plant,
one man almost died from loss of blood as a result of the shochet cutting
him while he was attempting to restrain the head of a struggling steer. 109
Accordingly, a reduction in workmen's compensation claims will often
pay for the cost of installing more humane and safer restraining
systems. 10
The United States is somewhat primitive in holding on to the ritual
slaughter exemption and allowing shackling and hoisting to continue."'
Canada, Australia, New Zealand, England and other European countries
have prohibited the practice." 2 Clearly, there is a legitimate concern
with anti-Semitism.1'3 Yet, it must be emphasized that a ban on shack-
ling and hoisting is not a ban on ritual slaughter. In Israel, shackling and
hoisting is not an acceptable restraining method in performing the rit-
ual. " 4 Furthermore, many authorities within the Jewish community it-
it is more efficient and more economical, and on that basis, I think, you have to relate
the cost item, not to the initial cost, but what does it do in terms of the quality of
product, the methods in which the product is handled, the salability of the product,
the general economics involved in it and also certain social standards. It costs money
to have a health and welfare union for your workers, and it costs money to have time
and a half for overtime, but we have laws that say you have to have it.
Id.
105. Grandin, supra note 15, at 442.
106. Id. For plants which handle over 100 animals per hour, the conversion may cost
about $250,000. Id. However, the ASPCA pen is fairly inexpensive ranging from $5,000 to
$35,000. Id. For small animals, the ASPCA pen may cost even less, approximately $3,000 in
materials. Id.
107. Id. For example, at Utica Veal, after installation of the new restrainer, there was only
one accident. Id. Prior to the installation, there were five accidents in an 18-month period
resulting in 126 lost work days. Id.; see also 7 U.S.C. § 1901 (1988) (finding that use of hu-
mane slaughter methods results in safer and better working conditions).
108. Grandin, supra note 15, at 442.
109. Id.
110. Id.
111. Id.
112. Id.
113. See Jones, 374 F. Supp. at 1289 n.7.
114. See id.
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self oppose shackling and hoisting.' 15 In fact, "[t]he elimination of
shackling and hoisting as a method of restraint would help strengthen
the position of shehitah in the United States," as there are many who
believe, unfortunately, that the cruel practice is part of the ritual.'
16
Congress should amend the Humane Slaughter Act to require that
animals subject to ritual slaughter must be restrained by a humane
method. Thus, as amended section 1902 might read:
Either of the following two methods of slaughtering and han-
dling are hereby found to be humane:
(a) (unrevised)
(b) by slaughtering in accordance with the ritual require-
ments of the Jewish faith or any other religious faith
that prescribes a method of slaughter whereby the
animal suffers loss of consciousness by anemia of the
brain caused by the simultaneous and instantaneous
severance of the carotid arteries with a sharp instru-
ment provided that the animal is restrained in a com-
fortable upright position." 7
Section 6 would be repealed as, clearly, it is a catch-all provision
exempting ritual slaughter from using humane restraint methods." 8
B. The Broader Issue-Animal Rights vs. Religious Freedom
The ritual slaughter controversy, because of the availability of alter-
natives, is fortunately one with a solution which seems capable of accom-
modating both religious and animal interests. A more difficult inquiry
arises, however, when both interests cannot be simultaneously accommo-
dated and one has to yield. Thus, for example, in 1958 the compelling
115. For example, the Union of Orthodox Jewish Congregations of America (OU) and the
Joint Advisory Committee of the Synagogue Council both support the use of restraining pens
for cattle, a humane alternative to shackling and hoisting. Grandin, supra note 15, at 437. In
fact, all OU-supervised kosher slaughter plants are required to use a restraining pen for cattle.
Id. at 437. The OU is an entity which supervises the labeling of foods as complying with
Jewish dietary laws.
116. Id. at 444-45.
117. The question arises whether only ritual slaughterers might use the section 1902(b)
alternative. One might argue that if the two methods were equally humane, a slaughterer
might be permitted to choose his preference. It remains arguable whether making the restraint
methods associated with ritual slaughter humane renders the two methods of slaughter equally
humane. See supra note 28, infra note 167. The author's position is that if ritual slaughter is,
in fact, any less humane, it should not be accommodated. In such a case, the discussion con-
cerning the need to accommodate the Santeria's religious practice of animal sacrifice is rele-
vant. See infra notes 119-229 and accompanying text.
118. See 7 U.S.C. § 1906.
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question might have been whether the first amendment required that the
Humane Slaughter Act provide an exemption for ritual slaughter. To-
day, a clear case which illustrates the conflict involved in this broader
issue is the Santeria religion's challenge to animal anti-cruelty ordi-
nances. The broader issue, then, is whether the free exercise clause re-
quires that an exemption be granted to such groups and, if not, whether
such an exemption should even be permitted.
1. The free exercise right
a. supreme court precedent
The free exercise clause of the first amendment to the United States
Constitution provides that "Congress shall make no law respecting an
establishment of religion, or prohibiting the free exercise thereof .... "119
Whether the clause prohibits Congress from making laws which are not
specifically intended to prohibit the free exercise of religion, but which,
nevertheless, incidentally burden it, has been a recurring theme in reli-
gious freedom cases.
1 20
The earliest Supreme Court interpretation of the free exercise clause
appeared in Reynolds v. United States.12 1 In Reynolds, a Mormon
claimed that the free exercise clause allowed him to practice polygamy as
prescribed by his religion.1 22  In analyzing what religious freedoms the
Constitution guarantees, the Court stated that, while the first amendment
protected religious opinion, it did not protect religious actions which
were a violation of social duties.123 Polygamy was an "offense against
society."124 The Constitution, therefore, did not require a religious ex-
emption from a generally applicable law prohibiting the practice of
polygamy.
125
Reynolds provided that the free exercise clause does not grant an
absolute right.' 26 The Court compared religious opinion with religious
action, emphasizing that, while the government cannot make a law bur-
119. U.S. CONST. amend. I (emphasis added).
120. See, eg., Department of Human Resources v. Smith, 110 S. Ct. 1595 (1990) (generally
applicable law prohibiting use of peyote); Bowen v. Roy, 476 U.S. 693 (1986) (generally appli-
cable law conditioning welfare benefits on furnishing of social security number); Sherbert v.
Verner, 374 U.S. 398 (1963) (generally applicable law conditioning unemployment compensa-
tion benefits on claimant's acceptance of available suitable employment).
121. 98 U.S. 145 (1878).
122. Id. at 161-62. Polygamy is the practice of having two or more husbands or wives at
the same time. BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 1044 (5th ed. 1979).
123. Reynolds, 98 U.S. at 164.
124. Id. at 165.
125. Id. at 166-67.
126. Id. at 164.
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dening religious opinion, it can make a law burdening religious action
which is a violation of a social duty. 27
Sherbert v. Verner 121 was the first and, until recently, the leading
case in the Supreme Court's modem interpretation of the free exercise
clause, 2 9 setting forth a balancing test for religious exemption controver-
sies.'30 In Sherbert, the issue was whether a Seventh-Day Adventist was
required to take employment requiring her to work on Saturday, a prac-
tice her religion prohibited, in order to be eligible for unemployment
compensation.' 3' The Court held that the disqualification for unemploy-
ment compensation benefits clearly imposed a burden on the plaintiff's
free exercise right. 32 The Court next considered whether there was a
compelling state interest which justified the infringement of the plaintiff's
first amendment fights. 133 Finding no compelling state interest, the
Court held for the first time that a neutral law-one not directed at reli-
gion-unconstitutionally violated the free exercise clause of the
Constitution. 134
The Sherbert balancing test implied that, once the plaintiff showed
that a law or governmental practice interfered with the free exercise of
his or her religious beliefs, the burden shifted to the government to show
that the law or practice was necessary to the accomplishment of a com-
pelling secular objective.' 35 Since Sherbert, however, the Court has ap-
peared reluctant to apply the test in favor of granting religious
exemptions from general laws.1 36 Furthermore, since 1972, the Court
127. Id. The Reynolds conclusion is consistent with more recent Supreme Court decisions
as well. See, eg., Smith, 110 S. Ct. at 1599; Sherbert, 374 U.S. at 402.
128. 374 U.S. 398 (1963).
129. McConnell, The Origins and Historical Understanding of Free Exercise of Religion, 103
HARV. L. REv. 1410, 1412 (1990). The most recent Supreme Court decision on the free exer-
cise clause appears to reject the Sherbert analysis in cases outside the unemployment compen-
sation field and those involving generally applicable criminal laws. See Smith, 110 S. Ct. at
1602-03.
130. Sherbert, 374 U.S. at 403.
131. Id. at 399-402.
132. Id. at 403.
133. Id. at 406.
134. Id. at 410.
135. Id. at 406-07.
136. The Court has applied the Sherbert test and held that the free exercise clause requires
states to provide a religion-based exemption from general laws on only four occasions since
1962. See Frazee v. Illinois Dep't of Employment See., 489 U.S. 829 (1989) (denial of unem-
ployment compensation benefits to individual on ground that his refusal to work was not based
on tenets of established religion violated his first amendment right to free exercise of religion);
Hobbie v. Unemployment Appeals Comm'n, 480 U.S. 136 (1987) (denial of unemployment
compensation benefits to individual who refused to work on Sabbath for religious reasons vio-
lated her first amendment right to free exercise of religion); Thomas v. Review Bd., 450 U.S.
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has not granted any claim for a religion-based exemption outside the very
narrow scope of unemployment compensation. 137 Justice Rehnquist has
criticized the Sherbert test, stating, "Where... a State has enacted a
general statute, the purpose and effect of which is to advance the State's
secular goals, the Free Exercise Clause does not... require the State to
conform that statute to the dictates of religious conscience of any
group.'
138
The Court's most recent free exercise decision appears to solve the
problem of inconsistency in applying the Sherbert test to religious ex-
emption controversies. In Department of Human Resources v. Smith,139
the plaintiffs were fired from their jobs with a private drug rehabilitation
organization because they ingested peyote for sacramental purposes at a
ceremony of the Native American Church of which they were mem-
bers. 11 Subsequently, the plaintiffs applied for, and were denied, unem-
ployment compensation because they had been discharged for work-
related misconduct-using peyote. 4' The consumption of peyote was
prohibited by Oregon's controlled substance law, which did not include
an exception for consumption for sacramental purposes. 142 The plaintiffs
in Smith claimed they were entitled to a religious exemption from the
707 (1981) (denial of unemployment compensation benefits to employee who terminated his
employment for religious reasons violated his first amendment right to free exercise of reli-
gion); Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205 (1972) (requirement that member of Old Order
Amish send his children to school until age sixteen violated his first amendment right to free
exercise of religion).
137. See, eg., Smith, 110 S. Ct. 1595 (rejecting claim that free exercise clause prohibits
application of state drug law to ceremonial ingestion of peyote); Goldman v. Weinberger, 475
U.S. 503 (1986) (rejecting claim that free exercise clause grants orthodox Jewish air force
officer right to wear yarmulke while on duty and in uniform); Bob Jones Univ. v. United
States, 461 U.S. 574 (1983) (rejecting religious school's free exercise claim to tax exempt status
because of school's religious rule against interracial dating and marriage); United States v. Lee,
455 U.S. 252 (1982) (rejecting self-supporting religious group's free exercise claim to not con-
tribute to Social Security because it violated their religion).
In 1972, in Wisconsin v. Yoder, the United States Supreme Court granted to a member of
the Old Order Amish an exemption from a law which required that children attend school
until age sixteen. 406 U.S. at 234. The Court found it significant, however, that the Amish
"alternative mode of continuing informal vocational education" resulted in a "minimal differ-
ence between what the State would require and what the Amish already accept." Id. at 235-
36. Thus, unlike the general cases where an exemption may adversely affect the state's interest,
in granting the Amish an exemption the state's interest in educating children would not be
adversely affected. Id. at 236.
138. Thomas, 450 U.S. at 723 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting).
139. 110 S. Ct. 1595 (1990).
140. Id. at 1597-98.
141. Id. at 1598.
142. Id.
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criminal statute.
143
In a five-to-four opinion, the Court held Sherbert applicable only to
the narrow field of unemployment compensation.'" The Court recalled
that, although at times it had applied the Sherbert test to analyze free
exercise challenges to generally applicable criminal prohibitions, it had
never used the test to invalidate one.145 The Court then concluded that
the Sherbert test was inapplicable to such challenges, 46 and that permit-
ting its application would "open the prospect of constitutionally required
religious exemptions from civic obligations of almost every conceivable
kind-ranging from compulsory military service... to... animal cru-
elty laws.'
47
The Smith decision is likely attributable to the fact that many neu-
tral and otherwise valid laws cannot pass the Sherbert "compelling inter-
est" test. Requiring the government to adhere to that standard would
inevitably result in the government tailoring its health and safety laws to
conform to the diversity of religious beliefs.'
48
After Smith, the applicability of Sherbert remains unclear. The nar-
rowest implication of Smith is that the Sherbert test does not apply to
neutral criminal laws which are generally applicable, and which are unre-
lated to unemployment compensation. A broader reading, however, im-
plies that the test is inapplicable to any neutral, generally applicable law,
even outside the unemployment compensation area.
b. church of the lukumi babalu aye v. city of hialeah
The Santeria religion, represented by the Church of the Lukumi
143. Id.
144. Id. at 1602-03. Justice O'Connor wrote an opinion concurring in the judgment but
disagreeing with the Court's opinion. Id. at 1607 (O'Connor, J., concurring). Justices Black-
mun, Brennan and Marshall joined parts I and II of Justice O'Connor's opinion. Id.
(O'Connor, J., concurring), Justice Blackmun, with whom Justices Brennan and Marshall
joined, dissented. Id. at 1615 (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
145. Id. at 1603 (citing United States v. Lee, 455 U.S. 252, 257-60 (1982); Gillette v. United
States, 401 U.S. 437, 462 (1971)).
146. Id.
147. Id. at 1605. Predictably, Justice Brennan was one of the four justices upholding the
broader applicability of the Sherbert test. Id. at 1607 (joining parts I and II of Justice
O'Connor's concurring opinion); id. at 1615 (joining Justice Blackmun's dissenting opinion).
Thus, his retirement will not change the ultimate position of the Court on the issue of constitu-
tionally mandated religious exemptions.
148. Brief of the Humane Society, supra note 25, at 4. The government, for example, might
be compelled to permit snake handling in religious ceremonies, see State ex rel. Swann v. Pack,
527 S.W.2d 99 (Tenn. 1975), cert. denied, 424 U.S. 954 (1976), or the use of marijuana for
religious reasons, see United States v. Middleton, 690 F.2d 820 (1 1th Cir. 1982), cert. denied,
460 U.S. 1051 (1983).
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Babalu Aye, practices animal sacrifice during many of its religious cere-
monies. 14 9 Practitioners argue that animal sacrifices are necessary to
cure illnesses and sanctify births, deaths and marriages. 5 ° The animals
sacrificed in the Santeria ceremonies include chickens, pigeons, doves,
ducks, guinea fowl, goats, sheep, and turtles.15 1 Only priests conduct
animal sacrifice, and they are taught as apprentices through
observation.
152
Typically, the initiation rite lasts eight days and the sacrifices all
occur consecutively on the second day.153 Approximately six four-legged
animals and twenty-four chickens are sacrificed. 154 The animals are
brought into the initiate's room for the initiate to touch, and are then
sacrificed. 5' In the faith healing rites usually one animal is sacrificed,
and the illness is then believed to pass to the animal.'
56
Generally, for the sacrifice, the animal is placed on a table on its left
side.' 57 The apprentice holds the animal's legs and the priest holds the
animal's head, which extends beyond the edge of the table. 5 The knife
is always held in the priest's right hand, whether or not he is right-
handed. 1 59 The priest punctures the neck of the animal with a knife in-
serted into the right side and all the way through the animal's neck."6
Some of the smaller animals undergo a different experience. Their heads
are twisted or torn off by the priest, sometimes by gnashing the head
off. 1
61
There is scientific evidence that the method of killing involved in the
Santeria sacrifices is not humane. 62 Puncturing the animal's neck does
not guarantee that both carotid arteries can be simultaneously severed.' 63
149. Resnick, To One City, It's Cruelty. To Cultists, It's Religion, Nat'l L.J., Sept. 11, 1989,
at 8, col. 1.
150. Id.
151. Church of the Lukumi Babalu Aye v. City of Hialeah, 723 F. Supp. 1467, 1471 (S.D.
Fla. 1989), appealfiled, No. 90-5176 (11th Cir. Feb. 22, 1990).
152. Id.
153. Id.
154. Id. at 1474. Since about 600 initiations are performed per year, this means that ap-
proximately 12,000 and 18,000 animals are sacrificed in the initiation rites alone each year. Id.
at 1473 n.22.
155. Id. at 1474.
156. Id.
157. Id.
158. Id.
159. Id.
160. Id.
161. Brief of the Humane Society, supra note 25, at 11 (citing McFarland, The Secrets of
Santeria Part Two, 2 ANIMALS' VOICE 42, 44 (1989)).
162. Church of Lukumi Babalu Aye, 723 F. Supp. at 1472.
163. Id.
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Furthermore, young goats and sheep have arteries which are deeper
within the vertebrae and, thus, they are not likely to lose consciousness
instantaneously.' Chickens pose a special problem because they have
four carotid arteries that must be severed and there is a possibility that
one of the arteries might be missed.16 5 The animals which undergo these
sacrificial ceremonies experience intense fear. 1 6 6 Additionally, animals
which experience fear often secrete chemical metabolites known as pher-
omones, and the odor of these can trigger an intense fear reaction in
other animals that detect those odors.1 67 Moreover, animals which are
used for sacrifice are often kept under inhumane conditions until they are
sacrificed.
168
Between June 9 and September 22, 1987, the City Council of Hi-
aleah, Florida enacted four ordinances aimed at ending the practice of
animal sacrifice in Hialeah. 1 69 The first ordinance was a general criminal
statute adopting as city law the Florida state anti-cruelty to animals stat-
ute.170 The second ordinance explicitly criminalized the possession of
animals for sacrifice. 171 The last two ordinances expressly prohibited
animal sacrifice and empowered humane societies to assist in the investi-
gation of violations.
1 72
The Hialeah ordinances were prompted by a concern with animal
abuse which the Church of the Lukumi Babalu Aye was attempting to
institutionalize. 17  Nevertheless, the ordinances were not intended to
discriminate against the church. Rather, they applied equally to any in-
dividual or organization practicing animal sacrifice.174 The church
brought an action against the city of Hialeah claiming that the ordi-
nances regulating ritual animal sacrifice violated their First Amendment
free exercise right. 75 In applying the Sherbert test, the court found that
the ordinances had three secular purposes: (1) preventing cruelty to ani-
164. Id.
165. Id. at 1473.
166. Id.
167. Id.; see Brief of the Humane Society, supra note 25, at 10. The author does not ignore
the position that animals which undergo ritual slaughter under Jewish dietary law may also
experience similar fear. See supra note 28.
168. Church of Lukumi Babalu Aye, 723 F. Supp. at 1474.
169. Hialeah, Fla., Ordinance 87-40 (June 9, 1987); id. 87-52 (Sept. 8, 1987); id. 87-71
(Sept. 22, 1987); id. 87-72 (Sept. 22, 1987).
170. Hialeah, Fla., Ordinance 87-40 (June 9, 1987); see also FLA. STAT. ANN. § 828.12
(West 1976 & Supp. 1991) (state animal anti-cruelty law).
171. Hialeah, Fla., Ordinance 87-52 (Sept. 8, 1987).
172. Id. 87-71 (Sept. 22, 1987); id. 87-72.
173. Brief of the Humane Society, supra note 25, at 6.
174. Church of Lukumi Babalu Aye, 723 F. Supp. at 1479.
175. Id. at 1469.
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mals, (2) safeguarding the health, welfare and safety of the community,
and (3) preventing the adverse psychological effects on children exposed
to such sacrifices.
176
During the trial, expert testimony revealed that the method of kill-
ing was not humane because there was no guarantee that the person per-
forming the sacrifice could cut through both carotid arteries
simultaneously. 17 7 Furthermore, the city established that the church
generally obtained the animals from botanicas or from local farms which
bred the animals specifically for sacrifice. 178 Such animals were often
subject to overcrowding and filthy conditions, and sometimes remained
without food and water until sold for sacrifice.
179
Expert testimony also revealed that the animals which undergo the
ritual experience both extreme pain and fear.'8 0 In chickens, stress and
fear affect the immune system which leads to the increased growth in
their systems of bacteria, especially salmonella.' 1 Salmonella is harmful
to humans, and visual inspection would not reveal its presence in the
chicken.' 8 2 Experts further testified that the remains of animals were
sometimes left in public places-most often near rivers or canals, by
four-way stop signs, under certain palms and on people's lawns or on
doorsteps." 3 The animal carcasses were health hazards in that they at-
tracted flies, rats and other animals.8 4 Thus, the risk of spreading dis-
ease to humans was increased.' 85
Finally, experts testified regarding the effect on children's welfare.
The Santeria initiation rites generally involve adults, but children as
young as seven years have been initiated."8 6 Nevertheless, children of all
ages are permitted to watch the sacrifices, provided that their parents are
present.18 7 This testimony established that exposure of children to the
sacrifices "would detrimentally affect the mental health of the child and
the behavior in such a way that it would be detrimental to the commu-
nity in which the child resides."' 88 The court accepted that there was a
176. Id. at 1477.
177. Id. at 1472.
178. Id. at 1474.
179. Id.
180. Id. at 1473.
181. Id.
182. Id.
183. Id. at 1474.
184. Id.
185. Id. at 1474-75.
186. Id at 1474.
187. Id. n.25.
188. Id. at 1475.
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correlation between the observation of violence and aggressive behavior
in children," 9 and that animal sacrifice is, contrary to the plaintiffs' ex-
pert opinions, a violent act.' 90
Thus, finding that the purpose of the ordinances was secular, and
that the ordinances regulated conduct, not religious belief,1 91 the court
analyzed the governmental interests in enacting the ordinances. 192 The
court held that the city's concerns with both community health and the
welfare of children were clearly compelling governmental interests. 193
More significantly, the court found that protecting animals from cruelty
was "equally compelling."' 94 The court noted that "[e]ven absolute pro-
scriptions of religious conduct are constitutional when the law serves a
compelling state interest .... Compelling governmental interests, in-
cluding public health and safety and animal welfare, fully justify the ab-
solute prohibition on ritual sacrifice."' 195
c. application of current free exercise doctrine
The Church of Lukumi Babalu Aye has appealed the district court's
decision to the Eleventh Circuit. Oral arguments have been heard, but as
of the writing of this Comment, no decision has been rendered. Yet, in
light of the Smith decision, published after Church of Lukumi Babalu
Aye, the church's position may have become much more precarious. 196
Smith suggested that Sherbert, which provides a stricter test with which
the government restrictions on religious freedom must comply, is limited
to controversies which involve unemployment compensation. 197 Fur-
thermore, the Smith Court noted, "Even if we were inclined to breathe
into Sherbert some life beyond the unemployment compensation field, we
would not apply it to require exemptions from a generally applicable
criminal law." '98
Smith strongly suggests that the Sherbert test applies only to contro-
versies involving unemployment compensation, and clearly holds that it
does not apply to generally applicable criminal laws with a secular pur-
189. Id.
190. Id. at 1476.
191. Id. at 1483.
192. See supra notes 128-34 and accompanying text.
193. Church of Lukumi Babalu Aye, 723 F. Supp. at 1485-86.
194. Id. at 1486.
195. Id. at 1487.
196. See Smith, 110 S. Ct. at 1603; supra notes 136-48 and accompanying text.
197. Smith, 110 S. Ct. at 1603.
198. Id.
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pose. 199 Nevertheless, even if the Sherbert test is held to apply in animal
rights-free exercise controversies, it would likely be satisfied. The district
court's analysis in Church ofLukumi Babalu Aye may provide guidelines
for applying the Sherbert test to such challenges. The court held that
prevention of cruelty to animals is an interest "equally compelling" to
concern with community health and safety, and with the welfare of chil-
dren-interests which have generally been held sufficiently compel-
ling.2"° The state, furthermore, has a strong interest in protecting
animals "in that they are living sentient beings that have the capacity to
suffer and are wholly dependent upon human protection."20 1
Thus, animal anti-cruelty laws which do not include exemptions for
religious practices determined to be inhumane appear to be a constitu-
tional exercise of government power. The question, thus, becomes
whether, although a legislature may not be constitutionally compelled to
grant such an exemption, it might nevertheless be permitted to do so.
The answer lies in determining whether animals have rights and whether,
if they do, we can permit an ideology to suppress them.
d. the animal rights perspective
i. Tom Regan and discarding Descartes
The seventeenth-century French philosopher, Rene D6scartes, es-
poused the view that animals were "thoughtless brutes," automata, ma-
chines.2 "2 Essentially, animals were seen as different from machines only
in that they were alive.2"3 Neither was conscious.2" Tom Regan sum-
marizes D6scartes' views: "In place of electrical current passing through
wires and circuits, animals have... various 'humors' or 'animal spirits'
which... cause, when stimulated, various behavioral responses in the
animal .... ,205 Descartes' views were held also by the scientists of his
day who administered beatings to dogs without pity, rationalizing that
their cries were merely the noise caused by touching a little spring.20 6
199. Id. at 1602.
200. Church ofLukumi Babalu Aye, 723 F. Supp. at 1485-86; see, eg., New York v. Ferber,
458 U.S. 747 (1982) (safeguarding physical and psychological well-being of a minor is compel-
ling); Prince v. Massachusetts, 321 U.S. 158 (1944) (state's interest in protecting community
from exposure to communicable disease or ill health overcomes religious exercise freedoms);
Jacobsen v. Massachusetts, 197 U.S. 11 (1905) (state has unquestionable power to preserve and
protect public health).
201. Brief of the Humane Society, supra note 25, at 2.
202. T. REGAN, THE CASE FOR ANIMAL RIGHTS 3 (1983).
203. Id. at 8.
204. Id.
205. Id.
206. Id. at 5.
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Gradually, Descartes' views were discarded as too simplistic.2 °7
One objection to his approach was that, if the behavior of animals could
be explained as mechanistic, so could the behavior of humans.2"8 But, of
course, that would go too far. It is a "necessary assumption for any work
in moral philosophy" that human beings are not "mindless machines,"
but are creatures with a mental life.2°9
D6scartes' theory also became questionable in light of the Darwin-
ian theory of evolution.21 0 That is, consciousness has survival value, and
the mental life of animals plays a role in their adaptability to a changing
environment.211 Thus, it is reasonable to conclude that homo sapiens are
not unique in having conscious awareness.212
Today, the position that certain animals, at least, have conscious-
ness, is part of the commonsense view of the world. 13 Those who do not
recognize the reasonableness of this position are guilty of "human chau-
vinism"-the belief that humans are unique in having consciousness.
214
"Where one draws the line regarding the presence of consciousness is no
easy matter, but our honest uncertainty about this should not paralyze
our judgment in all cases.... Our ignorance about the shadowy borders
of attributions of consciousness is no reason to withhold its attribution to
humans and those animals most like us in the relevant respects. ' 21 5
ii. Peter Singer and utilitarianism
In 1975, Peter Singer published his book, Animal Liberation, expos-
ing numerous atrocities that our society commits against animals, and
establishing an ethical framework for the modem animal rights move-
ment. 1 6 Singer advocates the position that animals have interests that
warrant recognition and protection. In support of this position, Singer
quotes Jeremy Bentham:
"The day may come, when the rest of the animal creation may
acquire those rights which never could have been withholden
from them but by the hand of tyranny. The French have al-
ready discovered that the blackness of the skin is no reason why
207. See id. at 21-25.
208. Id. at 9-10. See id. at 10-17 for Descartes' possible defense and its inadequacy.
209. Id. at 17.
210. Id. at 18.
211. See id. at 18-21.
212. Id.
213. Id. at 28.
214. Id. at 33.
215. Id. at 30.
216. See generally P. SINGER, supra note 5.
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a human being should be abandoned without redress to the ca-
price of a tormentor. It may one day come to be recognized,
that the number of the legs, the villosity of the skin, or the ter-
mination of the os sacrum, are reasons equally insufficient for
abandoning a sensitive being to the same fate. What else is it
that should trace the insuperable line? Is it the faculty of rea-
son, or, perhaps the faculty of discourse? But a full-grown
horse or dog is beyond comparison a more rational, as well as a
more conversable animal, than any infant of a day, or a week,
or even a month, old. But suppose the case were otherwise,
what would it avail? the question is not, Can they reason? nor,
Can they talk? but, Can they suffer?" '217
This position underlies Singer's analysis of the rights society is com-
pelled to extend to its animals. According to Singer, the capacity for
suffering is the standard for determining whether a being has rights.21
Thus, at a minimum, animals should have a right to be free from
suffering.
219
In the United States, there has been a trend toward giving animals
increasing legal protection.220 Animal welfare legislation has been en-
acted into numerous anti-cruelty laws, including the Animal Welfare
Act,2 2 1 which restricts the use of animals for laboratory research,22 2 and
prohibits animal fighting.223 Additionally, the federal government has
enacted wildlife-protection laws,2 24 humane-slaughter laws, 225  and
animal-transportation laws.226 In fact, all fifty states currently have
some form of criminal statute prohibiting cruelty to animals.227 Courts
217. Id. at 7 (quoting 1. BENTHAM, INTRODUCTION TO THE PRINCIPLES OF MORALS AND
LEGISLATION 311 n.1 (Haffner ed. 1948)).
218. Id. at 8-9.
219. Id.
220. For a detailed discussion of animal protection legislation, see generally D.S. MORET=I,
ANIMAL RIGHTS AND THE LAW (1984).
221. 7 U.S.C. §§ 2131-2157 (1988).
222. See id. § 2143.
223. See id. § 2156.
224. See, e.g., Marine Mammals Protection Act of 1972, Pub. L. No. 95-522, 86 Stat. 1027
(codified as amended at 16 U.S.C. §§ 1361-1407 (1988)).
225. See, e.g., Humane Methods of Slaughter Act of 1978, Pub. L. No. 95-445, 86 Stat.
1069 (codified as amended at 7 U.S.C. §§ 1901-1906 (1988); 2-J.S.C. §§ 601, 603, 610, 620
(1988)).
226. See, e.g., Cruelty to Animals Act, ch. 3594, 34 Stat. 607 (1906) (codified as amended at
45 U.S.C. §§ 71-74 (1988)).
227. See, e.g., ARIz. REv. STAT. ANN. §§ 13-2910 to -2910.04 (1989); CAL. PENAL CODE
§§ 597(b), 597.5 (West 1990); FLA. STAT. ANN. §§ 828.01-.26 (West 1976 & Supp. 1990);
N.Y. AGRIC. & MKTS. LAW §§ 350-377 (McKinney 1972 & Supp. 1991); see also D.S. MO-
RETrI, supra note 220, at 1 (noting additional state laws).
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have also recognized that avoiding animal cruelty is an established public
policy of the United States.22
The position that animals have rights, at least basic rights to be free
from pain, is not one which we should leave to the whim of individuals.
It is a position that should be endorsed as the rule in a moral society.
This was summarized well during the 1956 hearings on the Humane
Slaughter Act:
[1It is particularly and especially desirable to eliminate from
our national life any cruelty which seems to have a social sanc-
tion. Individual cruelty, what often the humane societies expe-
rience, purely psychopathic cruelties, they are bad because the
animals are damaged. They are bad because they offend our
sensibilities. But they don't have great social consequences.
But it is really important to the well-being of our Nation that a
gargantuan crime of the kind that we are talking about should
not have public approval.229
IV. CONCLUSION
The recent trend in the Supreme Court's interpretation of the reli-
gious exemption doctrine appears to suggest that the Court is reluctant
to hold that such exemptions are required.230 The most recent Supreme
Court decision on the issue of whether a religion-based exemption is con-
stitutionally mandated, suggests strongly that the question may be re-
solved even without the benefit of weighing the religious interests
involved.231 The Supreme Court has noted,
"Conscientious scruples have not, in the course of the long
struggle for religious toleration, relieved the individual from
obedience to a general law not aimed at the promotion or re-
striction of religious beliefs. The mere possession of religious
convictions which contradict the relevant concerns of a polit-
ical society does not relieve the citizen from the discharge of
political responsibilities.
2 32
The animal restraint methods involved in ritual slaughter clearly
228. See, eg., Church of Lukumi Babalu Aye, 723 F. Supp. at 1486; Humane Soc'y of
Rochester & Monroe County v. Lyng, 633 F. Supp. 480,486 (W.D.N.Y. 1986); C.E. Am., Inc.
v. Antinori, 210 So. 2d 443, 444 (Fla. 1968).
229. Hearings, supra note 1, at 108 (statement of Fred Myers, Executive Director of the
National Humane Society).
230. See supra notes 136-48 and accompanying text.
231. Department of Human Resources v. Smith, 110 S. Ct. 1595, 1603 (1990).
232. Id. at 1600 (quoting Minersville School Dist., Bd. of Educ. v. Gobitis, 310 U.S. 586,
594-95 (1940)).
1394 [Vol. 24:1367
June 1991] RITUAL SLAUGHTER AND ANIMAL RIGHTS
contradict social concerns of decency. Indeed, such concerns underlie
the enactment of the Humane Slaughter Act.2 33 Had the ritual slaughter
exemption been left out of the Humane Slaughter Act, Smith is fairly
clear that an appeal to the United States Supreme Court would probably
not have proven fruitful.
Similarly, the animal sacrifices involved during initiation and faith
healing ceremonies of the Santeria religion impose intolerable amounts of
suffering on animals and circumvent the established moral attitudes of
the people of this country. The Hialeah ordinances, like other animal
anti-cruelty laws were enacted to further these established morals. Ex-
emptions from laws intended to protect animals from such suffering
clearly are neither necessary, nor permissible.
Freedom of religion can no longer support claims for exemptions
from animal anti-cruelty laws that clearly have general applicability.
Such laws are enacted to satisfy our moral inclination that sentient be-
ings have a right to be free from physical abuse. It strongly undermines
our sense of morals to exempt groups of individuals from laws with such
purposes in the name of religious freedom. Holding ideas more impor-
tant than the right of a living, feeling thing to be free from immense
suffering is fundamentally dangerous.234 Nothing in the first amendment
requires such a conclusion. Nothing in natural law would permit it. In
the natural hierarchy of things we should be, first, a society of decent
people. Only once we have fulfilled the natural requirements of social
decency can we diverge from others in our beliefs and practices.
Tali H. Shaddow*
233. See 7 U.S.C. § 1901 (1988).
234. Brief of the Humane Society, supra note 25, at 17.
* The author would like to thank Professor Temple Grandin, not only for her assistance
in writing this Comment but, more generally, for her innovation in finding practical solutions
to the problem of shackling and hoisting conscious animals.
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